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  Using a two period model with moral hazard and uninsured risk, we argue 
that the decline in equity premium from its historically high level is due to a 
gradual elimination of barriers to universal banking. The loan contracts set up 
by financial intermediaries became more complete in nature with the advent of 
universal banking in the 90s following the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act. Hence, it is 
the nature of the loan contracts, not just the borrowing constraint and 
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1. Introduction 
Two stylized facts are of considerable academic interest in finance.  First, the historical US 
equity premium during the period 1889-1979 is too high to be consistent with a smooth 
aggregate consumption stream ((Mehra and Prescott, 1985).  Second, the US equity premium 
showed a pronounced decline during recent years (Blanchard, 1993, Jagannathan et al, 2000, 
Fama and French, 2002).   Jagannathan et al. (2000) attribute the recent decline in premium 
to a gradual elimination of market imperfections.  Lettau et al. (2004) argue that the recent 
low premium is due to a decline in macroeconomic risk.   
In this paper, we seek an alternative explanation of these two stylized facts.  We 
argue that the decline in equity premium from its historically high level is due to a gradual 
elimination  of  barriers  to  universal  banking.    The  loan  contracts  set  up  by  financial 
intermediaries became more complete in nature with the advent of universal banking in the 
90s following the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act.
1  The completeness of the loan contract lowered 
the  uninsurable  consumption  risks  of  the  households  when  they  participate  in  the  stock 
market vis-à-vis the bond market.   
To  demonstrate  this  we  construct  a  model  without  aggregate  risk  but  only  with 
idiosyncratic project risks.  When household’s choice of effort in a project is hidden, banks 
while financing this project stipulate an incentive compatible contract only to partially insure 
individual’s  consumption  to  eliminate  shirking.  This  makes  the  borrowing  constraint 
endogenous.  In a benchmark case of grand or complete contracting where banks monitor 
every financial transaction of the borrower, the equity premium is zero even though the 
borrowing  constraint  is  binding.
2    A  positive  equity  premium  emerges  in  an  incomplete 
contracting scenario where household’s transactions in equity market are kept outside the 
purview  of  the  contract  exposing  the  household/shareholder  to  a  greater  uninsurable 
                                                 
1In contrast with the extant literature focusing on aggregate risk (Lettau et al., 2004) and borrowing constraint 
(Constantinides et al., 2002), our exercise highlights the role of the banking environment in explaining the size 
of the premium.  Our model has a direct bearing on a growing body of literature exploring the link between 
asset market frictions and the premium.  Such frictions tend to arise out of incomplete markets or borrowing 
constraints. Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1996, 1997) looked for 
explanations for a high premium in terms of incomplete markets where individuals fail to insure their income in 
the presence of permanent shocks.  
 
2 In contrast with Constantinides et al. (2002), in our model the borrowing constraint is endogenous driven by 
the incentive compatible constraint. Our exercise also illustrates that such a borrowing constraint alone cannot 
solve the equity premium puzzle.     3
consumption risk.  The size of the premium depends on the degree of completeness of the 
contract as well as the extent of informational friction.  
The comparison of these two contracting environments, complete vs. incomplete, is 
motivated by the degree of integration between commercial and investment banking in the 
United States during the post Glass-Steagall Act era.  A regime of complete contracting 
requires  financial  institutions  to  have  full  ownership  rights  over  firms  managed  by 
households meaning banks can explicitly control the number of shares issued by households 
via optimal contracts. However, in the United States the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited such 
cross ownership until 1999 when the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act  effectively  eliminated this 
barrier.  Hence,  during  the  Glass-Steagall  era,  banks  or  financial  intermediaries  were  not 
legally allowed to stipulate stock market transactions of a firm. We envisage such an era as a 
regime of incomplete contracting. The repeal of this law permitting the cross-ownerships 
resembles  an  environment  of  complete  contracting.  The  equity  premium  also  sharply 
declined during this era of banking reforms.  The testable hypothesis that emerges from our 
model is that the low equity premium in the 90s is due to a change in the nature of the loan 
contractual environment following these banking reforms. 
3 
 We perform two sets of quantitative exercises. First we  compare our  incomplete 
contract  model  with  a  standard  representative  agent  model  with  aggregate  risk.  We 
demonstrate that even without any aggregate risk, our model with informational friction and 
incomplete contracts has the potential to outperform a standard representative agent model 
with aggregate risk in predicting the Mehra-Prescott historical equity premium.  Second, we 
consider  an  intermediate  contracting  environment  mixing  the  features  of  complete  and 
incomplete contracts.  Using this model, we calibrate the degree of contract completeness 
based on the low equity premium estimates in the post 1990 period.    
                                                 
3 Though much of the literature on Glass-Steagall Act focuses on separation of investment and commercial 
banking preventing banks to underwrite securities of the borrowing firm, our emphasis here is on the 
prohibition of cross ownership among these two types of institutions that gives rise to incomplete contracting 
and emergence of equity of premium. Furthermore, empirical literature documents relaxation of this Act over a 
period of time leading to a final dismissal in 1999, suggesting a somewhat smooth transition from incomplete to 
complete contracting environment. For example, the Bank Holding Company Act allows financial firms to 
acquire 5% of the voting stock of a commercial firm. In 1987, the Bank holding companies and non bank 
subsidiaries were allowed given more freedom to participate in the equity markets. See  Barth, Brumbaugh and  
Wilcox (2000). The equity premium also showed a gradual decline during this era.    4
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In  the  following  section  we  lay  out  the 
environment.  Section 3 describes the model with moral hazard, but with complete contracts. 
Section 4 outlines an environment with incomplete contracts. Section 5 explores the equity 
premium puzzle and reports the calibration results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.  Environment  
 
The model adapts Kocherlakota (1998). 
4 There are continuum of identical agents in the unit 
interval who live only for two periods.  At date 1, a stand-in agent is endowed with y units of 
consumption goods, and an equity which represents a claim to date 2 output.  The value of 
this equity is Q, which is basically the date 1 value of date 2 output. This Q can be divided in 
shares. Suppose there are 
-
x such shares in supply. Out of these  
-
x shares, the agent keeps x 
and sells 
-
x - x at  the spot price Q.  The buying and selling of shares takes place at date 1.  
Since  
-
x is a constant, it can be safely normalized to unity.   The representative agent’s own 
share (x) gives him proceeds in the second period.  What proceeds he would get depends on 
the nature of the production technology to which we now turn.  
 
             The agent invests k units of capital at date 1 which goes through a production process 
and results in output depending on the interaction between idiosyncratic risks and the agent’s 
choice of efforts.  Individual’s effort is a binary variable assuming 0 and 1 for no effort and 
positive efforts respectively.    If individuals exert effort in period 1, then output will be 
) (k f with probability p , and 0 with the complementary probability.  This basically means 
that a fraction p of agents in the unit mass would succeed while the remaining 1-p will fail. If 
they do not exert effort, output will be  ) (k f  and 0 with probability q and 1-q respectively 
where q p > . The cost of effort is given by j . The function  ) (k f is increasing ink . All the 
risks in technology are idiosyncratic in nature. There is no aggregate risk.   
 
                                                 
4 We introduce financial intermediaries, and loan contracts explicitly in Kocherlakota’s (1998) setting.  We 
analyze the historical equity premium as well as declining premium while Kocherlakota focuses only on the 
historical premium itself.  See also Kahn (1990) for a model addressing related issues.   5
Let us next turn to the financing of projects.  There are competitive banks which 
provide loans (l) to the agent in the first period and offer a safe rate r to the depositors.   
These loans are subject to default risk. If the project succeeds, the agent makes a repayment 
of R to the bank and if it fails he walks out paying nothing (due to limited liability).   
However, if project risks are independent and individuals are distributed in a continuum, 
intermediaries can generate a safe rate of return  ) (r  by invoking the law of large numbers.
5 
Hence, the expected profit of an intermediary assuming that agents have exerted efforts is:  
l r pR l r p l r R p ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( 0 )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ + - = + - - + + - .                  (1) 
If there is free entry and exit, then zero expected profit of the intermediaries implies: 
0 ) 1 ( = + - l r pR .                (2) 
 
 Since these banks are competitive, the individual just faces a menu of contracts R and 
l which satisfies this zero profit condition.  The agent picks the R and l from this menu in 





The utility function facing each agent is additively separable in consumption at each date and 
is of the form: 
     ) ( ) ( 2 1 c v c u U + =               (3)   
where  where  i c   =consumption  in  period  i,    i=1,2,    u(.)  and  v(.)  are:  (a)  three  times 
continuously differentiable, (b) concave, and (c) has a convex form for the marginal utility. 
Hence, agents are risk-averse.   
To sum up, the resource constraint of the individuals are given by: 
l Q y xQ k s c + + = + + + 1               (4) 
s r R k xf c
g ) 1 ( ) ( 2 + + - =   and    s r c
b ) 1 ( 2 + =          (5) 
                                                 
5 The probability of all projects failing is close to zero because (1-p)
n approaches zero as the number of 
independent projects, n approaches infinity. By this, we assume no-bankruptcy for the banks.      6
where  =
g c2   consumption  in  the  second  period  when  the  project  is  successful. 
=
b c2 consumption  in  the  second  period  when  the  project  is  unsuccessful,  
and s=individual’s saving. 
Hence, the expected utility of a representative agent is: 
j - - + + = ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1
b g c v p c pv c u U , which can be rewritten as: 
j - + - + + + - + - - - + + = ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) ( [ ] ( s r v p s r R k xf pv xQ k s l Q y u U   (6) 
   
 
3.  Moral Hazard and Endogenous Borrowing Constraint: The Case of Grand   
Contracting 
 
We now introduce informational frictions due to moral hazard.  Let the choice of 
entrepreneurial  effort  be  a  private  knowledge  to  the  household  and  unobserved  by  the 
financial intermediaries or banks. It is well known that complete smoothing of consumption 
(thus full insurance) will destroy the incentives to exert higher levels of effort. Hence, the 
intermediaries  would  issue  a  loan  and  charge  a  borrowing  rate  of  interest  such  that 
consumption is only partially insured.
6  
The banks set up non-linear contracts with the households regarding the choice of all 
its financial variables, R, l, x and s.   All these variables are determined by optimal contracts 
under which borrowers maximize their expected utility subject to a zero profit condition of 
the intermediary and the incentive compatibility condition. With the binary choice of efforts, 
such an incentive compatibility condition is: 
q p
s r v s r R k xf v
-
³ + - + + -
j
) ) 1 (( ) ) 1 ( ) ( (                         (7) 
Since individuals exert effort at the beginning of the second period (before the resolution of 
uncertainty),  this  standard  condition  states  that  the  gain  in  expected  utility  from  zero  to 
positive effort must be non-zero.  Hence, the optimal contract problem can be written as: 
                                                 
6 In the presence of full information about entrepreneurial effort, full consumption insurance takes place. All the 
idiosyncratic project risks will be transferred from the risk averse households to the risk neutral financial 
intermediaries. The banks pool the risk by redistributing consumption between the lucky and unlucky 
households in an actuarially fair fashion, meaning c2
g=c2
b=pf(k).  In fact, a social planner can also implement 
the same risk pooling.      7
 
j - + - + + + - + - - - + + = ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ) ( ( ] (   } , , , , { s r v p s r R k xf pv xQ k s l Q y u U Max x R k s l  
     




s r v s r R k xf v
-
³ + - + + -
j
) ) 1 (( ) ) 1 ( ) ( (             (9) 
which can be rewritten after substituting out R using (8):   
j - + - + - + + + - - - + + = ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( )) )( 1 ( ) ( ( ) (
} , , { . max s r v p
p
l
s r k xf pv xQ k s l Q y u L
k s l  





s r k xf v
-
- + - - + + +
j
m       (10) 
First-order conditions are: 
     
0 )}] ( ) ( { )} ( ) 1 ( ) ( )[{ 1 ( ) ( : 2 2 2 2 1 = ¢ - ¢ + ¢ - + ¢ + + ¢ -
b g b g c v c v c v p c v p r c u s m     (11) 
 
0 ] 1 )[ ( ) 1 ( ) ( : 2 1 = + ¢ + - ¢
p
c v r c u l
g m
              (12) 
0 ] 1 )[ ( ) ( ) ( : 2 1 = + ¢ ¢ + ¢ -
p
k f xp c v c u k
g m
            (13) 
0 ] 1 )[ ( ) ( ) ( : 2 1 = + ¢ + ¢ -
p
k f c v p Q c u x g m
            (14) 
 
Characterization of Equilibrium  
1. Given r and Q, agents choose l, s, R, x optimally which satisfy the above first order 
conditions.    
2.  Loan and Equity markets clear meaning s=l and x=1.   
 
From these first-order conditions, we immediately deduce the following proposition. 
   8
Proposition 1: The households are credit constrained and risks are uninsured so that 
b g c c 2 2 >  
Proof:   Assuming (9) binds it follows immediately that 
b g c c 2 2 > .  In view of this, from (11) 
and (12), it follows that  
0
) ( ) ( ) 1 (
)] ( ) ( )[ 1 (
2 2
2 2 >
¢ + ¢ -
¢ - ¢ -
= b g
g b
c v p c v p
c v c v p p
m                                   (15)                                
Verify now from (12) that   0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 > ¢ + - ¢
g c v r c u , implying that individuals would be 
better-off with additional borrowing.   
The incentive compatible constraint deters full consumption insurance. The household would 
always wish that they could save and borrow more.
7  The incentive compatible constraint is 
thus equivalent to a borrowing constraint.  
 
Equity Premium 
   We next turn our attention to pricing of equity and the resulting equity premium in 
this setting. We have the following proposition.   








 and equity premium is zero   
Proof: The proof directly follows from (12), and (14) and the expression of   in proposition 1 
as well as the equilibrium condition that  . 1 = x    
 
  Because  of  the  incentive  compatible  constraint  the  marginal  rates  of  substitution 
cannot be equalized state by state.   Despite the presence of uninsurable consumption risk, 
the equity premium is zero. To see the intuition, note that the contracts in this model are 
Pareto optimal in the sense that all the individual risks are fully contracted.  A social planner 
can also allocate the consumption risk for an economy like this.  Once the social planner 
optimally allocates the risk, the marginal rates of substitution are not equal across states.  The 
following proposition makes it evident.  
 
Proposition 3: The following social planning problem is isomorphic to the present optimal 
contract environment.  
                                                 
7 See equation 11, which illustrates that the marginal benefit of saving exceeds its marginal cost because m>0.    9
 
Max    ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1
b g c v p c pv c u - + +            (P) 
s.t.  y k c = + 1 ; 
) ( ) 1 ( 2 2 k pf c p pc b g = - + ; and  
q p




) ( ) ( 2 2 . 
 
Proof: Plug the equilibrium conditions s=l, x=1, into the household’s sequential budget 
constraints (4) and (5) and then multiply the second period budget constraints  (5) for good 
and bad states by p and (1-p) respectively, add them up to get the social planner’s resource 
constraints.  
In the next step, check that the first order condition of the social planning problem (P) 




















k pf c u
                (16) 
 
Next combine the first order condition (13) of the optimal contract problem, substitute out 
the lagrange multiplier m using (15) and verify that it reduces to (16). 
8  
      The zero equity premium results from the fact that there is no aggregate risk in this 
model.    All  the  idiosyncratic  individual  risks  are  properly  contracted.    The  presence  of 
borrowing constraint and uninsurable risk, per se, thus cannot explain the existence of equity 
premium, as long as all project risks are contracted in advance. 
9 
       
                                                 
8 It is instructive to note that the first order condition of this social planning problem resembles the Pareto 
optimal contract condition in Rogerson (1985) although Rogerson’s setting is quite different from ours.  
9 One may be curious to know what happens to equity premium in the presence of aggregate risk and moral 
hazard.  In the presence of aggregate risk, the equity premium would be of course positive because it will reflect 
the non-diversifiable aggregate uncertainty. The issue is whether the presence of moral hazard would make any 
difference in the size of the equity premium.  We have an example (available from the authors upon request) 
illustrating that the  moral hazard does not make any difference to the size of the equity premium even if  
aggregate risk is present.  
   10
4. Incomplete Contracts  
We  now  consider  a  contractual  arrangement  in  which  a  positive  equity  premium 
emerges. Consider a contracting environment where household’s issue of shares (x) is not 
monitored by the bank, and hence it is outside the purview of the contract.  In this sense this 
contractual arrangement is incomplete as opposed to the grand contracting described earlier. 
Households  make  decision  about  purchase  of  shares  (x)  without  taking  into  account  the 
incentive compatibility condition for positive effort. The competitive banks, on the other 
hand, design an optimal contract about the deposit (s), loans (l), repayment (R), and project 
(k) which are incentive compatible for the household regarding the choice of positive effort. 
Both  households  and  banks  move  simultaneously  and  thus  banks  cannot  observe  the 
household’s choice of shares.
10  In a Nash equilibrium, all these variables are determined 
simultaneously which is formalized as follows.
11 
 
Characterization of Equilibrium 
1.  Given r, Q  s, l, k, R, the household chooses the share holding x, which maximizes its 
expected utility (6) subject to the bank’s zero profit condition (2).  
2.  Given  r, Q and x  competitive banks offer a menu of contracts,  s, l, k, R which maximize 
household’s expected utility (6) subject to the bank’s zero profit condition (2) and incentive 
compatibility condition (9).  
3.   The share and loan markets clear meaning x=1 and s=l.   
  
  The first order condition for the household’s issue of shares is:  
                                                 
10 The enforceability of financial contracts between an individual and an intermediary depends on the degree of 
commitment by both parties to adhere to contracts. Since savings are held as deposits with the intermediary and  
there could be an element of irreversibility in the choice of capital, mechanism of commitment could work 
perfectly with these variables. On the other hand, individuals could buy or sell shares from the market (not from 
the intermediaries), the degree of commitment is lesser with the amount of shares transacted.   
 
11 Since households and banks move simultaneously, banks do not observe household’s issue of shares.  The 
household thus does not need to take into account the effect of purchase of shares (x) on the IC condition.   An 
alternative contractual arrangement would be that the household moves first about the issue of shares (x) and 
then banks sign contracts with the households about the remaining variables upon observing x. Such a 
contracting environment would give rise to a zero equity premium because the households will be able to arrive 
at the same Pareto optimal contracts as in the previous section by the optimal choice of x.  The assumption that 
banks do not observe household’s issuance of shares is motivated by the separation between commercial and 
investment banking during the Glass-Steagall era.    11
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( : 2 1 = ¢ + ¢ - k f c v p Q c u x
g               (17)  
 
The optimal contract problem for the bank is now written as: 
j - + - + + + - + - - - + + = ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ) ( ( ) (   } , , , { s r v p s r R k xf pv xQ k s l Q y u U Max R k s l  
     
subject to  l r pR ) 1 ( + =      
and (7).  
 
The problem can be rewritten as: 
j - + - + - + + + - - - + + = ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( )) )( 1 ( ) ( ( ) (
} , , { max s r v p
p
l
s r k xf pv xQ k s l Q y u L
k s l  
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j
m      
 
First-order conditions: 
0 )}] ( ) ( { )} ( ) 1 ( ) ( )[{ 1 ( ) ( : 2 2 2 2 1 = ¢ - ¢ + ¢ - + ¢ + + ¢ -
b g b g c v c v c v p c v p r c u s m     (18) 
 
0 ] 1 )[ ( ) 1 ( ) ( : 2 1 = + ¢ + - ¢
p
c v r c u l
g m
               (19) 
0 ] 1 )[ ( ) ( ) ( : 2 1 = + ¢ ¢ + ¢ -
p
k f x c v p c u k
g m
             (20) 
 
Equity Premium  
Denote the proportional equity premium in this incomplete contract economy as EP
INC.  The 
proportional equity premium is the ratio of the gross expected return on stock and gross 
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We have the following proposition.  





+ =1  
 
Proof:   Using (17) and (19), we get: 
 









                                                     (22) 
which immediately proves the proposition.    
The  equity  premium  is  thus  determined  by  the  shadow  price  of  the  incentive 
constraint and it is positive.
  12  Households while participating in the stock market bear a 
greater uninsurable consumption risk than when they participate in the bond market. This is 
because the bond market transactions are under the purview of the optimal contract while the 
stock market transactions are not. The lagrange multiplier, which is basically the shadow 
price of incentive compatible constraint, drives a wedge between the perceived intertemporal 
marginal  rate  of  substitution  (IMRS)  of  the  consumer/shareholders  and 
consumer/bondholders.    This  cross  sectional  heterogeneity  of  the  IMRS  gives  rise  to  a 
positive equity premium.  
In  an  influential  paper  Constantinides  and  Duffie  (1996)  show  that  the  partial 
consumption insurance and the consumer heterogeneity together could explain the equity 
premium.  In our model this partial consumption insurance arises due to moral hazard which 
gives rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint. However, this alone cannot explain the 
equity premium if this partial consumption insurance is contracted in advance. One also 
needs additional heterogeneity of IMRS, which is driven in our model by the nature of the 
contract.  
The upshot is that the contractual environment is of paramount importance in driving 
the premium in the stock market.  To make this point more transparent, we next develop a 
special example economy in which the real allocations are identical in both grand contract 
and incomplete contract environments but the equity premium differs.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Note that a unit value of the proportional equity premium means a zero equity premium.     13
An Example  
 
One can further rewrite the equity premium by substituting out the lagrange multiplier 
m.  Use (18) and (19) to get the same expression as in (15), which upon substitution in (22) 
yields: 
) ( ) ( ) 1 (







c v p c v p
c v c v p
EP
¢ + ¢ -
¢ - ¢ -
+ =             (23) 
 
 
Assume the following parametric specifications of the utility function and the production 
function: 
 
  2 1 ln ln C C U + =  and  ak k f = ) ( .  
 
where a is a positive total factor productivity (TFP) term.  Using this specification, we get the 
following closed form solution for the proportional equity premium  INC EP . The appendix 
provides an outline of the derivation.  
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INC                                      (24) 




l .                                        (24a) 
 
and the riskfree rate is given by:  
ap r = + 1                                              (25) 
 
  The lagrange multiplier is directly proportional to the ratio of consumption in good 
and bad states which keeps the household just indifferent between shirking and not shirking.  
In the context of the logarthmic utility function this ratio is λ which is positively related to 
the disutility of effort y  as shown in (24a).    The higher the disutility of effort y ,  the 
greater  the  l .    l   is  thus  a  measure  of  informational  friction.  Note  that  a  higher 
informational friction raises the uninsurable risk of all the households. Since the household 
while participating in the share market bears even a greater uninsurable consumption risk, the   14
equity  premium  is  monotonically  increasing  in  the  informational  friction  parameter  l .  
When  y  is zero,  l  equals unity, in which case the equity premium vanishes because the 
informational friction is absent. 
13    
  We next compare the real allocations and the expected welfare in this incomplete 
contract economy and the grand contract economy described in section 3.  Let both these 
economies share the same logarithmic preference and the linear technology.  The Appendix 
A shows that the real allocations and the welfare are identical in both these scenarios even 
though  the  equity  premium  differs.    Thus  it  is  the  contractual  environment  not  the  real 
allocations that drives the equity premium.   
 
 
5 Equity Premium Puzzle 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the incomplete contract version of 
our model may be more effective in explaining the historically observed equity premium than 
a  representative  agent  (RA)  model  with  aggregate  and  idiosyncratic  risk.  Consider  the 
following representative agent who is subject to an aggregate output risk and idiosyncratic 
risk as follows.  The idiosyncratic risk is the same as in the earlier sections, meaning that 
with probability p, an agent can succeed in producing a positive output if he is in a good 
state. However, there is an aggregate risk in that with probability π, the output of all the 
agents can be higher.   
The aggregate production function is, therefore, given by: 
 












k f y B
G
                                                             (26) 
where  B G e e >  and G, B stand for aggregate good and bad states respectively.   
 
                                                 
13 The capital structure is endogenous here reflecting the nature of risk that individuals undertake in our set up. They tend 
to invest in risky technology in excess of loans that they take from the intermediary. This excess amount  ) ( l k - represents 
risk because in the bad state of nature, this amount is not recovered and the individuals alone bear this loss. Hence, the 
premium is also proportional to this amount. Note that   = -l k 0
2
]









  .                         15
There are four states of nature, (g,G), (b,G), (g, B), (b, B).   Assume that the agent 
contracts in advance in contingent claims markets by trading in Arrow-Debreu securities.   
Let  j q  be the price of a claim that pays one unit of consumption if the aggregate state is j 
(=G, B).  Define the price of a claim that pays one unit of consumption when the individual 
state is i (=g or b) and the aggregate state is j as  j i p , .  By law of large number, it follows 
that  j i p , = prob(i).  j q . 
14 
 
The representative agent thus solves the following program.   
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2  is the consumption in the second period when the individual state is i and the 
aggregate state is j, i=g,b and j=G,B.  
 









2 k f p c c B B b B g e = =                 (29) 
 
In other words, consumption will be equalized across individual states but not across 
aggregate states because aggregate risks cannot be pooled.
15  
 
                                                 
14 See Kocherlakota (1998) for a similar representation of Arrow-Debreu Pricing in the presence of aggregate 
and idiosyncratic risks.   
15 To see this observe that the equilibrium allocation of this economy can be solved by a social planning 
problem where the planner maximizes the same utility function subject to the following state contingent 
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2 = = .    Stock prices and risk free interest rate 
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1                                             (31) 
 
To make a valid cross-model comparison assume that the utility function is 
logarithmic (u(c) = ln c) and the production function is linear, i.e. f(k)=k.  The appendix 
shows that that the gross expected return on stock (call it m R ) and risk free rate (call 
it r Rf + =1 )  are given by:  
] ) 1 ( [ B G
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The expected return on the market portfolio is proportional to the expected total 
factor productivity (TFP hereafter) in this economy.   The proportional equity premium 
( RA EP  ) defined as the ratio of  m R to  f R  is given by:  
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w = .   
Note that the equity premium is independent of the probability (p) of individual success 





                                                 
16 The same does not happen in the incomplete contract economy because the individual risks do not go away in 
equilibrium.     17
Cross Model Comparison of Equity Premia 
We are now ready to compare the equity premium in the incomplete contract economy (INC 
hereafter) in (24) with that of the representative agent (RA hereafter) economy in (34).  Note 
that there is no aggregate consumption risk in the incomplete contract economy which means 
variance of consumption is zero meaning a perfectly smooth aggregate consumption in this 
environment . On the other hand, in the RA economy there is aggregate risk, which means 
that the variance of aggregate consumption is positive. 
  Why  do  we  compare  two  models:  one  without  aggregate  risk  and  other  with 
aggregate risk?   We do this comparison simply to identify the role of individual uninsurable 
risk in explaining the historical equity premium. If we can replicate the historical equity 
premium using a model without aggregate risk, such a model will do even better if we add 
aggregate risk to it.   We demonstrate now that this simple INC model with zero aggregate 
consumption risk but with informational frictions could outperform a standard RA model 
with aggregate risk in terms of reproducing the historical equity premium.  
To make a fair cross model comparison, we pose the following question.  Suppose we 
aim to replicate the historical equity premium and the riskfree rate in both INC and RA 
models.  What range of values of the parameters in each of these models will accomplish this 
goal?   Are these parameter values empirically plausible?  
There are two important parameters, i.e., λ and ω.  The parameter λ  is a measure of 
information friction in the INC model while ω is a measure of aggregate consumption risk in 
the RA model.  In order to replicate the historical equity premium and the riskfree rate in 
each of these models λ and ω have to be calibrated.    We proceed as follows. 
 
Calibration of λ 
We first turn our attention to the equation for  equity premium (24)  in the incomplete 
contract economy.  Following Kocherlakota (1998), we assume that aggregate and individual 
states are equally likely, meaning p=π=1/2. Moreover, we assume that individual and 
aggregate states are mutually independent.  We then calibrate the TFP parameter a of the 
INC model  by setting the riskfree rate ap in (25) equal to the historical average riskfree rate.  
In this way, the INC model exactly replicates the historical riskfree rate, and thus there is no   18
riskfree rate puzzle.  Finally using (24) and the historical equity premium, we can easily 
calculate λ.  
 
Calibration of ω 
We next turn our attention to the RA model.  In order to calculate  w , we need to 
know the aggregate states,  G e  and  B e .  Setting p=π=1/2, and Rm and Rf at the historical  
levels, we use (32) and (33) to solve these two aggregate states.  This solution strategy 




   Table  1  summarizes  the  results  for  various  available  datasets  for  the  US  equity 
premium.  The value of ω ranges from 1.49 to 1.77.  Following Kocherlakota (1998) the 
parameter ω which is the ratio of per capita consumption in good and bad aggregate states is 
actually  1.073.
17    The  RA  model  requires  at  least  50%  higher  aggregate  consumption 










   
                                                 
17These numbers are taken from Kocherlakota (1998).  Note that Kocherlakota’s specification of per capita 
consumption in good and bad aggregate states exactly apply to our RA model here.  
18 Since the RA model has aggregate uncertainty while the INC model does not have, in principle the total 
factor productivity estimates are different in these two models.  Note that  a  is the TFP in the INC model which 
we calibrated using the observed riskfree rate.  On the other hand, the TFP stochastically fluctuates between  
G e  and  B e in the RA model. We have calculated the expected TFP in the RA model which can be used as a 
reasonable benchmark of comparison with the TFP term a in the INC model.  For alternative data sets a ranges 
from 2.008 to 2.05 while the expected TFP ranges from 2.14 to 2.17.  The TFP estimates are not wildly 
different in these two models.         19
Table 1: Comparison of Incomplete Contract and  
Representative Agent Models  
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2.9  4.1  1.08  1.49 
1871-1999 
(Shiller) 








   
8.4  1.18  1.77 
Note: Summary of the various data sets came from Mehra and Prescott (2003). 
 
   On the other hand, the INC model does not require any aggregate consumption 
variation, which means that w is unity by construction.  What is the price we pay to replicate 
the historical equity premium and the low riskfree rate?.  One requires some degree of 
informational friction summarized by the parameter l as opposed to aggregate consumption 
risk in the RA model.  The range of variation of l is from 1.08 to 1.18.  Recall that a unit 
value of l  means no informational friction. Although we do not have any readily available 
estimate of λ based on microeconomic evidence, it is noteworthy that for INC model, only a 
moderate dose of uninsured consumption risk (8% to 18%) can replicate the historical equity 
premium and the risk free rate without invoking any aggregate consumption risk at all. 
19 Our  
incomplete contract model outperforms a standard  RA model in reproducing the historical 
equity premium.
20   
                                                 
19 In both models, we assume log utility, which means we do not require a high degree of risk aversion.  
  
20 The issue arises whether we can use a two period model to calibrate the historical average that is based on 
many periods. The equity premium in our model is averaged across states while in the data it is time averaged.  
Are these two averages comparable?  We assume that the model economy is stationary in the sense that the   20
 
 
Declining Equity Premium   
  We now turn our attention to declining equity premium.  The model described so far reflects 
two polar environments: (i) grand contract, and (ii) incomplete contract.  These two extremes 
can  be  thought  of  as  two  banking  regimes:  (i)  a  regime  of  full  integration  between 
commercial and investment banking,  and (ii) a regime of no integration between these two 
types  of  banking.    To  bring  more  realism  to  the  banking  contractual  environment,  we 
consider an intermediate scenario.  Define a new parameter  ) 1 , 0 ( Î q  as a measure of the 
degree of completeness of the contract.  A  higher value of θ means a greater degree of 
integration between commercial and investment banking.  In our model context, a higher θ 
means that the contract is more complete.   
 The optimal contract problem can be now rewritten as: 
j - + - + - + + + - - - + + = ) ) 1 (( ) 1 ( )) )( 1 ( ) ( ( ) (
} , , { max s r v p
p
l
s r k xf pv xQ k s l Q y u L
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- + - - + + +
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mq      
The household’s share valuation equation (17) now changes to: 
      0 ) 1 )( ( ) ( ) ( : 2 1 = + ¢ + ¢ -
p
k f c v p Q c u x g qm
            (35) 
The lagrange multiplier   now enters the household’s share valuation equation only to the 
extent the contract is complete in nature.  The grand contract and incomplete contract are two 
special cases when θ equals 1 and 0 respectively. 
  It is straightforward to verify that in this mixed contracting environment, the 
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probability distribution of states satisfies the ergodicity properties.  Thus the time average of any relevant 
variable (say equity premium) is the same as the ensemble average (defined over the state space).     21
In the context of our parametric example with logarthmic utlity and linear production 
function, (36) reduces to:  
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EPmixc             (37) 
It is easy to verify that the real allocations in this special logarithmic example is invariant to 
the banking integration parameter q .  Different contracting environments (q ) engender 
different equity premia without disturbing the real allocations and without bringing any 
aggregate risk.  This makes the calibration of q  easy.  
We calibrate the degree of banking integration parameter θ during the 90s when the 
progress towards universal banking was nearly complete.   The parameter p is fixed at the 
same level as in Table 1.  The informational friction parameter is fixed at the benchmark 
level, 1.13 which is the average of the λ values calibrated in Table 1.  The historical equity 
premium estimates during 1889-1979 came from Mehra and Prescottt (1985)  while estimates 
of the equity premium during the 90s based on S&P data  came from Jagannathan et. al. 
Table 4. 
21  Plugging the recent equity premium estimates into (37), we calculate the value of 
θ. The results are summarized in Table 2.   
Table 2: The Calibrated Degree of Contract Completeness Based on US Equity 
Premium  
Period  US Equity Premium  q  
1889-1979  6.18%  .25 
1990-99  2.51%  .60 
December 1999  1.26%  .80 
Note: The average equity premium estimates for 1889-1979 is from Mehra and Prescott (1985)  and the equity 
premium estimates during the 90s came from Jagannathan et al. (2000). 
 
                                                 
21According Jagannathan et al. (2000) estimates, the decline in equity premium started from 1970.  Since we 
argue that banking reform in the 90s is a potential candidate for the decline in premium, we only focus on the 
estimates of equity premium in the 90s for the purpose of calibration.  The question remains: why did the equity 
premium decline earlier? One may argue that the financial markets anticipated these reforms way ahead of time. 
Moreover, the progress towards universal banking was rather gradual suggesting a somewhat smooth transition 
from incomplete to complete contracting environment. See footnote 3 for documentation of some of the earlier 
banking reforms.  
   22
The historical equity premium of 6.79% corresponds to a contract completeness of 0.18 
which may be interpreted as a banking integration of about 18%   During the 90s, the equity 
premium averaged about 2.51%  meaning a value of  q  equal to 0.6.  It is noteworthy that the 
equity premium reached a value of  1.26% (lowest in the 90s) in December 1999  which  
coincided with the enactment of  the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act on November 12, 1999.  This 
Act virtually eliminated all barriers to the integration between commercial and investment 
banking making the contract nearly complete.  Based on our model we can infer that q  was 
close to 0.8 while a unit value of q  means full contracting or universal banking.   
 
6. Conclusion  
     A  number  of  recent  papers  make  the  point  that  the  equity  premium  is  traceable  to 
uninsurable risk and borrowing constraint.  Using a simple two period setting, we show that 
the nature of contracting between the financial intermediary and the household/entrepreneur 
is crucial for determining the equity premium.   Informational frictions such as moral hazard 
may lead to a borrowing constraint and uninsured risk but whether this will translate into a 
premium in the stock market depends on whether financial intermediaries such as banks exert 
any control over individuals’ transactions in the equity market.    Our calibration exercise 
shows that a simple model with incomplete contract where the bank has no control over the 
stock trading can outperform a representative agent model with aggregate risk. With slight 
modification, such an incomplete contract environment can explain the post 90s decline in 
the equity premium.  
   23
Appendix A 
Derivation of (24) 
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Then by using the logarithmic utility we get: 
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Use (2), (5) and the loan market clearing condition, s=l  to obtain 
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Plugging (A.2), (A.3) (A.4) into (A.1), and using (25) we get: 
2
y
k =                    (A.5)   
 
From the incentive constraint (9), we get: 
 
b g c c 2 2 l = ,                   (A.6) 
where  1 )) /( exp( > - = q p y l  
Plug (A.2), (A.3) into (A.6) and use the loan market equilibrium condition  l s =  to obtain the 
equilibrium loan amount:    24
 




l                    (A.7) 
 
Next use the expression for equity premium in (23) and use (A.2), (A.3), (A.7) to obtain (24).   
 
 
Comparing allocations in grand contract and incomplete contract environments 
 
We show now that in the context of the log utility example, the equilibrium allocations are 
identical in both the grand contract and incomplete contract environments.  First observe that  
that the first order conditions for s, l and k are identical in both environments (see (11) 
through (13) and (18) through (20)).  This means (A.1) holds for both environments.  The 
immediate implication is that (A.4) and (A.5) hold as well.  Using (A.2) through (A.7), and 
the loan market clearing condition, s=l, we get:  
2
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Since the equilibrium allocations  1 c ,  g c2 ,  b c2  are the same in both environments, it means 
that the expected utility is the same in both. However, this is true only in the context of the 






Derivation of (32), (33) and (34)  
 
The first order conditions based on (27) are:  
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Using (B.1) and (B.6), we get:  
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Next note that the economy-wide resource constraints and social plannin optima are:   
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We price the Arrow-Debreu securities in such a way that it supports the economy wide 
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The expected return on market portfolio (Rm) is given by:  
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which after substituting  (B.12) yields:  
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The risk free rate (Rf) is given by: 
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Dividing (B.16) by (B.17) we get the proportional equity premium given by (34).  
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